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The Director of Central Intelligence


Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00516-87/1  
5 February 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning  
FROM: Frederick L. Wetters  
National Intelligence Officer for Africa  
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 20 January 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

  
Frederick L. WettersAttachment:  
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20 January 1987

## WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

ADDENDUM: US/Africa--Implications of Reduced Aid. At our warning meeting on 16 December 1986, the INR speaker on the captioned topic provided a list of likely reactions to recently announced reductions of US aid. We reported these possible reactions in a standard 30-to-90-day warning note, but the speaker actually intended them to be mid-term warnings valid beginning about March 1987.

Liberia--Immediate Threats to Doe. CIA led the discussion of potential political and economic threats to President Doe which concluded that:

-- Doe is secure for now. Despite difficulties in paying the armed forces, he has the loyal support of key military units in and near Monrovia. Leading the lackluster political opposition, the UPP has lost momentum since it was unbanned last year. It withdrew from the recent elections and probably will assume a low profile over the near term. Opposition leaders are likely to call for demonstrations and strikes, but they have a poor record of success with such tactics.

-- Delinquent government payments head the list of Doe's economic woes. Doe complained to Secretary of State Shultz last month that the United States is not paying enough for the use of facilities in Liberia. He has few other options for new donations; the Soviets and Libyans appear unresponsive, and he won't get much from Firestone or the other foreign concessions. Economic decisionmaking in Monrovia is fractured, and policymakers lack the authority to compel Doe to accept their recommendations. We expect presidential calls for belt-tightening, along with labor strikes as the economic decline continues.

Warning Note: Doe probably will call for more US support. He may lash out at Washington as his frustration grows, demanding greater payments for US use of facilities in Liberia and possibly trying to squeeze US and other foreign concessions for payments. Doe probably will exaggerate the threat to his regime from dissidents located in nearby states, and is likely to look to Romania and others for arms or military aid, but we believe that government forces are capable of coping with the dissidents. A warning of increased risk to US nationals in Monrovia is unnecessary at this time.

Zaire/Angola--Possible FAPLA Crossborder Operations. CIA led the discussion. There was consensus that there is no need for a warning note now:

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-- Angolan forces probably will continue small-scale operations against UNITA in Zaire, and UNITA is likely to continue some operations from Zaire into Angola. A major Angolan-Zairian confrontation is unlikely, however, because Zairian President Mobutu has sent a conciliatory letter to Angolan President dos Santos, and because Luanda is cracking down on activities in Angola by the Zairian FLEC dissident group.

-- There is some risk of an unintended clash as a result of border deployments that have increased the proximity of forces from the two sides. Luanda and Kinshasa would try to keep any accidental incident from escalating. Nonetheless, Mobutu might characteristically exploit the situation to call for more Western support, and the recent Zairian Estimate noted that it may be to Luanda's advantage to stage an incident.

Chad--Military Developments and Potential for Escalation: DIA began the discussion of recent and projected military developments. There was consensus that:

-- Since late 1986, the Libyans have regained control of the main towns in the Tibesti mountains. This is not a serious setback for President Habre's forces, however, because the guerrillas need not hold towns and already are successfully ambushing Libyan convoys. Habre's forces also captured Fada in early January, and the Libyans have continued airstrikes in the area.

-- The Libyans want to retake Fada. They are calling up reservists and assembling a new Fada Liberation Operational Group at Ouadi Doum. Habre's forces also are preparing to attack Faya-Largeau or Ouadi Doum. Another Libyan loss like that at Fada is unlikely because Tripoli's forces have learned to be better prepared to defend and they may enjoy improved air support.

-- For now, the Libyans have restricted their air operations to north of the 16th Parallel. Libyan ground forces are unlikely to strike south of that line, preferring to use their Chadian allies for any such operations.

-- It is a waiting game, with both sides unable to move until better prepared. DIA noted that Habre attacked Fada with about 3,500 troops. An attack on Faya-Largeau would require drawing a substantial number of troops from Fada, thereby leaving Fada potentially more vulnerable to a Libyan attack. Both sides have quickened the pace of preparations but continue to suffer from resupply problems.

-- The war is unlikely to widen to Sudanese or Nigerien territory. [REDACTED] estimated that Libya may try a three-battalion end-run into southern Chad through Sudanese territory, but [REDACTED] reconnaissance has not discovered any Libyan columns in western Sudan.

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Warning Note: Both Habre's forces and the Libyans are planning major operations once preparations are complete. If French supplies arrive, especially fuel, Habre may attack Faya-Largeau or Ouadi Doum before the Libyans attack Fada, but we cannot predict the outcome of the expected battle. Escalation of French-Libyan tit-for-tat airstrikes is unlikely soon. [REDACTED]

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Meanwhile, Habre's guerrilla operations will continue to inflict Libyan casualties.

South Africa--Is the State of Emergency Working? The NIO/Africa introduced this topic with a list of the SOE's results to date. There was consensus that:

-- The daily death rate has fallen. The ANC was not able to celebrate recent anniversaries in any major way, and it is again in disarray partly as a result of the recent South African raid into Swaziland and South African-prompted evictions of ANC members from Mozambique. The consumer boycott in Port Elizabeth collapsed, and "black Christmas" was a flop. South African security forces have carried out successful cordon-searches of black townships without major repercussions. About 1,000 black fathers attacked UDF militants in the eastern Cape with the probable collusion of the armed forces. The UDF appears unable to explain effectively to affected blacks its support for international sanctions. Black children have returned to school on the government's terms with the encouragement of many black organizations. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] reports that politically conscious blacks in the important eastern Cape are seen as increasingly resigned to the situation. New auxiliary police detachments have begun to deploy.

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-- A CIA analyst noted that a recent bombing in a bazaar nearly succeeded, however, and that more dramatic attacks seem likely. Although the nationwide movement is in disarray, black grassroots organization continues. We should not make too much of the outcome of the schools boycott because many students also returned to school in January 1986.

-- Turning to ANC leader Tambo's meeting with Secretary of State Shultz, the NIO noted that many observers believe the ANC speaks with many voices. Some members, especially the SACP, probably disapprove of Tambo's meeting. DIA noted that Tambo did not have a clear ANC mandate for the meeting, and predicted that it would be largely a public relations exercise and an attempt to project an ANC image of reasonableness. A CIA analyst agreed that Tambo was unlikely to make any concessions or new policy statements.

Warning Note. The South African government will continue to hold the initiative over the next 90 days, and black organizations are demoralized and reactive. Tambo does not necessarily speak for the entire ANC, and other ANC officials may make contradictory statements. ANC actions, especially bombings, may be out of synchronization with any ANC statements.

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Lesser Issues. The NIO informally polled the community representatives on several potentially troubling issues:

-- Warning Note: Prospects for a South African Crossborder Strike. South Africa evidences a heightened aggressiveness to respond forcefully to any ANC provocation. Should there be an ANC attack clearly linked to a neighboring state, Pretoria is increasingly likely to respond with a crossborder strike.

-- More Ethiopian Airstrikes in Sudan Unlikely For Now. Ethiopia is unlikely to carry out new air raids on Ethiopian dissidents in Sudan as long as the EPRP holds Italian hostages.

-- Zambian Demonstrations Ended. While the unrest over food supplies and cornmeal price hikes has subsided, it severely shook the regime. Kaunda's decision to roll back the price increases appears likely to damage Zambia's IMF-mandated economic reform package.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

Office of the Vice President  
DIA/DE-4  
DIA/JSI-5B  
DIA/DB-8D  
Army/OACSI  
Army/AIAIT-AF  
Air Force  
State/INR  
NSA

INTERNAL:

DDI/ALA/AF  
DDI/CRES  
DDI/FBIS  
DDI/LDA  
DDI/NE SA  
DDO/AF  
DDO/EPS  
ICS/OHC  
O/NIO/Warning

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